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Examining conspiracy beliefs and
COVID-19 in four countries: The role
of disgust towards the political system
and implications for prosocial behavior
Chanki Moon1 and Giovanni A. Travaglino2
Abstract
Since late 2019, the coronavirus SARS-COV-2 responsible for the COVID-19 disease has continued to spread across different
regions of the world. As a result, governments have been implementing measures for controlling the disease which rely on
people’s cooperation. In this research, we considered predictors and implications of people’s beliefs that they “haven’t been
told the ‘whole story’ about COVID-19.” Specifically, we examined the role of disgust towards the political system in pre-
dicting conspiratorial tendencies across four countries, in Europe (Italy and the UK), North America (the USA), and Asia
(South Korea). In addition, we investigated the implications of conspiratorial beliefs for individuals’ intentions to engage in
prosocial cooperative behavior. In line with the idea that feelings of disgust towards the political system may indicate that
people perceive the system as violating core norms, results showed that disgust was associated with stronger conspiratorial
tendencies. Individuals’ conspiratorial tendencies were in turn associated with lower intentions to help others during the pan-
demic. Results were broadly consistent across the countries tested. Directions for future research are discussed.
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Since late 2019, the coronavirus SARS-COV-2 responsi-
ble for the COVID-19 disease has been spreading world-
wide. As a result, governments have been implementing
measures for preventing the transmission of the disease,
including recommending handwashing, wearing face
masks, and self-isolation (Chu et al., 2020; World
Health Organization, 2020). Despite these efforts, the
speed of viral propagation has been decreasing slowly,
especially in Europe and the USA. Governments’ efforts
have been hampered, at least in part, by public suspicion
towards the official account of events (Oleksy et al.,
2021), and lack of cooperation among people. On
August 25, the Director-General of the World Health
Organization (WHO) stated that “We’re not just battling
the virus. We’re also battling the trolls and conspiracy the-
orists that push misinformation and undermine the out-
break response” (WHO, 2020). In support of his word,
data from a survey conducted in the United States in
mid-March indicated that 48% of US American adults
reported that they have seen some news and information
about the COVID-19 disease which appeared to be a com-
plete fabrication (Mitchell & Oliphant, 2020).
People’s skepticism towards the authorities’ ‘official
account’ is therefore a crucial problem that may become
particularly acute as vaccination programs to fight the
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disease are rolled out across countries. In the present
research, we consider predictors and implications of
people’s beliefs that they “haven’t been told the ‘whole
story’ about COVID-19.” Specifically, we examine the
role of emotional processes of disgust towards the political
system in predicting conspiratorial tendencies. We also test
the implications of conspiratorial beliefs for individuals’
intentions to engage in prosocial behavior. We compare
results from four different countries in Europe (Italy and
the UK), North America (the USA), and Asia (Korea) to
examine differences and similarities across regions.
Disgust towards the system and
conspiratorial tendencies
People’s perceptions of the system, authorities, and the
government play a crucial role in shaping their responses
to the pandemic. For instance, individuals who report
more trust towards the government are also more likely to
comply with official recommendations aimed at stopping
the spread of the disease (Bargain & Aminjonov, 2020;
Han et al., 2021; Kim & Kim, 2021; Morse et al., 2016;
Olsen & Hjorth, 2020; Pagliaro et al., 2021; Prati et al.,
2011; Rubin et al., 2009; San Lau et al., 2020; Tang &
Wong, 2003; Travaglino & Moon, 2021).
People’s perception of the system has also been linked to
the emergence of conspiratorial thinking (Bruder & Kunert,
2021; Einstein & Glick, 2013; Kim & Kim, 2021; van
Mulukom et al., 2021). Conspiracy theories describe the
ultimate cause of important events as the secret action
of a powerful group concealing information to further its
own interests (Brotherton, 2015; Douglas et al., 2017).
Conspiratorial thinking tends to increase substantially in
times of crisis due to perceived lack of control in relation
to novel, unexpected, or threatening events (Douglas et al.,
2017; Van Prooijen & Acker, 2015; Van Prooijen &
Jostmann, 2013; Whitson & Galinsky, 2008). It may
hamper authorities’ efforts to elicit cooperative behavior by
people. The current global pandemic is a fertile ground for
the proliferation of conspiratorial beliefs, due to the objective
lack of clear information about the COVID-19 disease.
Indeed, during the COVID-19 pandemic, individuals’
beliefs in conspiracy theory have increased significantly as
false information has been spreading on social media and
in the news (Shahsavari et al., 2020).
Research has so far focused on beliefs about the system’s
trustworthiness in the emergence of conspiratorial thinking
(e.g., Kim and Kim, 2021; Pagliaro et al., 2021). Relatively
less research has investigated the role played by emotions
towards the system in people’s responses to authorities’ “offi-
cial accounts” of the events. Research indicates that emotional
processes play a crucial role in shaping how individuals
process and appraise information (Martel et al., 2020). For
instance, anger promotes stronger reliance on heuristics
(Bodenhausen et al., 1994) and encourages partisanship in
the appraisals of (inaccurate) political information (e.g.,
Weeks, 2015). Conversely, negative emotions such as
anxiety may motivate individuals to probe information more
critically (Forgas, 2019; Weeks, 2015), increasing skepticism.
However, the specific role of positive or negative emo-
tional processes will likely depend on where (or towards
what) they are directed. Emotions directed at the political
system represent a crucial constitutive component of indivi-
duals’ experience of the social order in which they live,
influencing and shaping people’s understanding of institu-
tions and social structures in distinctive ways (Goodwin
et al., 2001; Gordon, 1990; Marcus, 2002; Weeks, 2015).
System-level emotions have important implications for
individuals’ behavior and actions across a variety of differ-
ent domains (Solak et al., 2012). Yet, very little work has
investigated their effects (cf. Travaglino and Moon,
2021), and none in the context of the current pandemic.
In the present research, we focus for the first time on indi-
viduals’ feelings of disgust towards the system. Disgust
refers to an unpleasant emotion felt against harmful objects
or ideas that evoke a sickening reaction (e.g., Rozin et al.,
2008). As the definition implies, feelings of disgust are func-
tional in protecting oneself from dangerous or contaminating
objects (Lazarus, 1991) that may threaten one’s health (e.g.,
foods, animals, body products, injuries, sexual behaviors,
death, and decay). Individuals who experience disgust feel
nauseous or queasy and, in turn, are motivated to avoid the
objects of disgust (Shook et al., 2019).
In the context of exposure to pathogens, feelings of
disgust may be adaptive and have positive behavioral impli-
cations (e.g., Díaz & Cova, 2020; Fleischman & Fessler,
2011; Rozin et al., 2008; Tybur et al., 2010; Tybur et al.,
2011). For instance, recent research shows that stronger
feelings of disgust against pathogens are associated
not only with greater concern about COVID-19, but also
with stronger intentions to engage in behaviors such as
social distancing, handwashing, and cleaning/disinfecting
(Shook et al., 2020).
Disgust is an especially crucial emotion because it may
function as an output of moral cognition. Individuals report
and display disgust towards actions that they view as moral
violations, even when such actions are irrelevant to pathogens
or sexual contents (see Tybur et al., 2013 for a review).
According to the Moral Foundations Theory (Graham et al.,
2009; Haidt, 2012; Haidt & Joseph, 2004), purity/sanctity is
a fundamental moral foundation “based on the emotion of
disgust in response to biological contaminants (e.g., feces or
rotten food), and to various social contaminants like spiritual
corruption, or the inability to control one’s base impulses”
(Koleva et al., 2012, p. 185). For example, individuals are
likely to assess certain behaviors (e.g., stealing a purse from
a blind person) as morally disgusting (Hutcherson & Gross,
2011; Nabi, 2002), and people often recall moral violations
related to fairness or harm as disgusting (Curtis & Biran,
2001; Haidt et al., 1997; Tybur et al., 2009).
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Thus, actions or objects that elicit disgust may be seen as
violating moral norms (cf. Kupfer and Giner-Sorolla, 2017;
Russell and Giner-Sorolla, 2013). In the context of people’s
perception of the system, disgust may play a crucial func-
tion because it may signal that the system is not aligned
to core moral beliefs. Specifically, we contend that those
who feel disgust towards the political system may be moti-
vated to avoid a system that is perceived as threatening,
dangerous, or as violating core moral principles. A potential
implication of this particularly strong form of system avoid-
ance may be increased skepticism towards authorities’ “offi-
cial versions” of events and, thus, stronger engagement in
conspiratorial thinking. Conspiratorial thinking may, in
turn, prevent individuals from engaging in the type of coord-
inate prosocial and cooperative behaviors which enable
groups to overcome collective hardships, such as the pan-
demic. We test this reasoning in the present study by exam-
ining whether feelings of disgust towards the system predict
stronger conspiratorial tendencies. Conspiratorial tendencies
should, in turn, be associated with lower tendency to engage
in prosocial and cooperative behavior. To examine the gen-
eralizability of these findings across contexts, we test our
model in four different countries.
Conspiracy beliefs and prosociality
Previous research has demonstrated that beliefs in conspir-
acy theories have negative implications across various
domains (see Douglas et al., 2017, 2019 for reviews).
In particular, individuals’ willingness to cooperate with
others may be hampered by the emergence of conspiratorial
tendencies. For example, research has demonstrated that a
generalized conspiracy belief that powerful forces work
secretly to dominate the world (Imhoff & Bruder, 2014)
can weaken prosocial behavior (Imhoff et al., 2018;
Jolley & Douglas, 2014a, 2014b). In the context of global
warming, Van der Linden (2015) showed that briefly
exposing the public to a conspiracy theory may reduce
general prosocial tendencies (e.g., donate or volunteer for
a charity). Moreover, previous research has demonstrated
the existence of an association between medical-related
conspiracy theories and health-risk behaviors, including
refusing to vaccinate, rejecting conventional medicine,
and seeking alternative medicine (e.g., Bogart et al.,
2010; Georgiou et al., 2020; Jolley and Douglas, 2014a;
Lamberty and Imhoff, 2018; Setbon and Raude, 2010).
Individuals’ intentions to act prosocially are important for
controlling the spread of COVID-19 effectively (Anderson
et al., 2020). Thus, in the present research we investigate
the association between individuals’ beliefs across conspir-
acy theories and their intentions to act prosocially in the
context of the pandemic. Recent research indicated that con-
spiracy beliefs describing the current pandemic as a hoax
were strongly (and negatively) linked to lower intentions to
engage in behavior aimed at containing the virus (e.g.,
avoiding crowd, staying at home in quarantine; Imhoff and
Lamberty, 2020). Furthermore, a large survey conducted in
eight countries (including the UK, USA, and Italy) showed
that individuals with high conspiracy beliefs were relatively
more concerned about their own well-being and less con-
cerned about the well-being of others. The latter study also
showed a relatively higher intention among those who
believed in conspiracy theories to engage in self-interested
behavior such as stockpiling, but a relatively lower intention
to engage in actions that would be useful in protecting others
(e.g., social distancing; Hornsey et al., 2021). Taken
together, previous findings lend support to the idea that indi-
viduals who have a conspiratorial mindset may be less likely
to enact behavior that helps others fight the virus.
Overview of the present study
In the present study, for the first time, we tested the idea that
feelings of disgust towards the political system may be asso-
ciated with stronger conspiratorial tendencies. In addition, we
tested the idea that such conspiratorial tendencies would, in
turn, be associated with lower intentions to act prosocially
and help control the spread of the disease (Hornsey et al.,
2021; Imhoff & Lamberty, 2020). We expected these linkages
should create an indirect effect of perceived disgust towards the
system on lower prosocial behavior via increased conspirator-
ial thinking, reflecting individuals’ lower intentions to cooper-
ate in response to a public crisis they appraise skeptically.
Finally, the present research also tested the generalizability
of our prediction in four large samples from different coun-
tries, in Europe (Italy and the UK), America (the USA),
and Asia (Korea). Although the emotion of disgust can be
recognized cross-culturally, it is important to test the general-
izability of the findings across different countries and regions
of the world. To this purpose, we selected countries character-
ized by different overall cultural profiles. In line with
Hofstede’s cultural framework and country-level cultural
indices (see Hofstede et al., 2010), Korea and Italy are char-
acterized by a higher acceptance of power inequality and hier-
archies than the UK and the USA. People in South Korea and
Italy tend to dislike ambiguity and uncertainty more than the
other two countries. In Italy, the USA, and the UK, people
emphasize individuality more strongly than in Korea, which
instead highlights the value of group harmony. Conversely,
on average, Koreans tend to report a stronger focus on the
future and the long term than the other countries. Such varia-
bility in the nations’ overall cultural outlines enables us to
explore the generalizability of our hypotheses broadly.
Method
Participants
Participants from Italy (N = 606; 294 female, 301 male, 11
unreported; Mage = 26.94, SDage = 7.72), the UK (N =
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606; 298 female, 305 male, 3 unreported; Mage = 34.03,
SDage = 11.28), the USA (N = 597; 291 female, 296
male, 10 unreported; Mage = 39.35, SDage = 13.16), and
South Korea (N = 693; 346 female, 342 male, 5 unre-
ported; Mage = 44.46, SDage = 13.15) took part in an
online survey on “cultural value and political action,”
which included a COVID-19-related module (see
Travaglino and Moon, 2021). Data were collected in
April 2020 using Qualtrics via Prolific Academic© for
Italy, the UK, and the USA and a large local research
panel for South Korea. All participants were compensated
with a small amount of money (2.75 USD for Italy, the
UK, and the USA and 3.09 USD for South Korea) in
exchange for their participation. All scales included for
the present research were originally developed in English,
and subsequently translated into Italian and Korean.
Equivalent meanings in the two languages were achieved
through the back-translation procedure, for which guide-
lines by Brislin (1986) were followed.1
Measures
Feelings of disgust towards the political system. Participants
reported their feelings of disgust towards the political
system in their country using four items (disgusted/
repulsed/ sickened/ grossed-out; 1 = not at all, 7 = com-
pletely; αtot = .96, αIT = .96, αUK = .96 αUS = .95, αKOR
= .97) (Russell & Giner-Sorolla, 2013). Higher scores indi-
cate higher levels of disgust.
Conspiratorial tendencies about COVID-19. Conspiratorial
tendencies about COVID-19 were measured using a
single item. We adapted a single-item measure of conspira-
torial tendencies previously used in other contexts (Lantian
et al., 2016) to the context of COVID-19. Participants were
asked to indicate their opinion about the falsity/truth of
the official version of events about COVID-19 given by
the authorities (1 = completely false, 9 = completely
true). Lower scores indicate higher levels of conspiratorial
tendencies.
The item was preceded by the following statement:
Some political and social events are debated in society. For
example, the world is currently debating about the virus
COVID-19. Specifically, it is being debated what the
virus COVID-19 is, where it comes from and what are its
effects. It is sometimes said that the “official account” of
this event could be an attempt to hide the truth from the
public about what COVID-19 really is.
Prosocial tendencies. Participants indicated how likely or
unlikely they were to do in the following four prosocial
acts which could help control spread of the coronavirus
disease (1 = extremely unlikely, 7 = extremely likely; αtot
= .72, αIT = .64, αUK = .72 αUS = .69, αKOR = .85):
“Donate money to associations at the national level that
are fighting the spread of the virus (e.g., national red
cross, civil protection)”; “Offer support to neighbors who
may need some assistance”; “Engage with local groups of
volunteers to help assisting people in need”; and “Use
social media to encourage people to practice social distan-
cing (e.g., encourage them to not leave their house).”
Higher scores indicate higher prosocial tendencies.
Control variables. Gender, age, and political orientation (1
item; “Considering the current political context in
[Country], how would you describe yourself?”; 0 = I am
a left-winger, 100 = I am a right-winger) were added as
covariates to the model to control for their effects on proso-
cial tendencies.
Results
Data were analyzed using multi-group structural equation
models with latent and observed variables. Analyses were
performed using R with the lavaan (Rosseel, 2012) and
ccpsych (Fischer & Karl, 2019) packages. Across models,
fit was evaluated using CFI (> .90), RMSEA (< .10) and
SRMR (< .10) indices (Hu & Bentler, 1998). Model com-
parisons were carried out using the scaled difference chi-
square tests (Satorra & Bentler, 2001). Invariance was
determined by examining the difference in CFI between
constrained nested models (Cheung & Rensvold, 2002).
Measurement invariance
We first sought to establish measurement invariance across
countries for the latent measures with multiple indicators
included in the model (i.e., disgust and prosocial tenden-
cies). Testing for invariance is crucial to ensure that
measures are interpreted and used similarly by participants
in different (national, cultural) contexts and, thus, that
results are meaningfully comparable. For each of the two
measures separately, we first tested for the configural
invariance model (establishing that items load on the desig-
nated factor across countries). Next, we tested for metric
invariance by constraining factor loadings to be equal
across countries. Finally, we tested for scalar invariance
by fixing the intercepts to be equal across countries. If
a model did not achieve full invariance, we sought to estab-
lish partial invariance by freeing the indicator (either
loading or intercepts) responsible for a misfit to vary
freely across countries.
Multigroup confirmatory factor analysis revealed that
the measure of disgust had good fit across countries, χ2
(4) = 12.33, p = 0.015, CFI = 0.99, RMSEA = 0.06,
SRMR < 0.01. Constraining the loadings to be equal
across countries did not cause the model to deteriorate
(ΔCFI = 0.01). However, the model’s fit deteriorated
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over the recommended threshold when we constrained the
intercepts to be equal across countries (ΔCFI = 0.02).
Releasing the intercept of the item [“grossed-out”] to vary
freely across countries resulted a satisfactory partially
scalar model (ΔCFI < 0.01) which we retained for further
analyses.
Similarly, the measure of individuals’ prosocial ten-
dencies achieved configural, χ2 (4) = 9.933, p = 0.042,
CFI = 0.99, RMSEA = 0.05, SRMR = 0.01, and metric
invariance (ΔCFI = 0.01). There was no full metric invar-
iance (ΔCFI = 0.14). However, allowing the intercepts of
the items “Offer support to neighbors who may need
some assistance” and “Engage with local groups of volun-
teers to help assisting people in need” to vary freely across
countries resulted in a satisfactory partially scalar model
(ΔCFI = 0.01), which we retained for further analyses.2
Table 1. Correlations, means, and standard deviations between study variables separately for each country
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6
1. Disgust —
2. Conspiratorial tendencies −0.12*** —
(−0.22***)
−0.25***
(−0.11**)
−0.12***
3. Prosocial tendencies 0.01 0.12*** —
(−0.10*) (0.14**)
0.05 0.02
(0.07) (0.18***)
0.02 0.20***
4. Gender −0.04* −0.01** 0.09*** —
(0.01) (−0.03) (0.14**)
−0.01 −0.00 0.15***
(0.07) (−0.05) (0.05)
−0.25*** −0.01** 0.03
5. Age 0.04* −0.07** 0.07*** −0.00 —
(0.04*) (−0.10*) (0.04) (−0.02)
−0.11** −0.03 −0.06*** −0.01
(−0.10*) (−0.00) (0.07) (0.12**)
0.16*** 0.01 0.14*** −0.09*
6. Political orientation −0.09*** −0.16*** −0.01 −0.10*** 0.23*** —
(0.11**) (−0.23***) (−0.11**) (−0.19***) (0.16***)
−0.30*** −0.12** 0.01 −0.04 0.15***
(−0.37***) (−0.11**) (−0.05) (−0.15***) (0.13**)
0.09* −0.16*** 0.02 −0.02 0.15***
Mtot 3.86 6.31 4.23 1.52 36.47 41.65
(SD) (1.83) (2.07) (1.37) (0.54) (13.32) (24.71)
MIT 4.17 6.95 4.11 1.53 26.94 35.10
(SD) (1.72) (1.86) (1.33) (0.55) (7.72) (22.75)
MUK 2.98 5.87 4.28 1.5 34.03 39.74
(SD) (1.72) (2.04) (1.43) (0.52) (11.28) (23.33)
MUS 3.70 6.19 4.10 1.53 39.35 38.39
(SD) (1.89) (2.03) (1.46) (0.55) (13.16) (29.16)
MKOR 4.5 6.24 4.39 1.52 44.46 51.85
(SD) (1.63) (2.17) (1.27) (0.54) (13.15) (19.83)
Note. Correlations between variables for the entire sample (N = 2502), Italian (N = 606), British (N = 606), American (N = 597), and Korean (N = 693)
participants are presented in order. Correlations for Italian and American participants are presented in parenthesis. For all scales, higher scores are
indicative of more extreme responding in the direction of the construct assessed. ***p< .001, **p< .01, *p< .05.
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Main analyses
Zero-order correlations, means, and standard deviations
across countries are summarized in Table 1. We tested a
structural model in which individuals’ disgust against the
political system predicted conspiratorial tendencies. In
turn, individuals’ prosocial tendencies were predicted by
both disgust and conspiratorial tendencies. The model fit
the data adequately, χ2 (206) = 721.71, p < 0.001, CFI =
0.96, RMSEA = 0.07, SRMR = 0.07. We compared the
latter model in which structural paths were free to vary
across countries to a model in which they were constrained
to be equal across countries. Model fit was significantly
worse when structural paths were constrained, Δχ [9] =
25.90, p = 0.002, indicating that there were differences in
coefficients across countries.
Next, we proceeded by systematically constraining one
path at a time to identify which paths differ across countries.
Constraining the paths from disgust to conspiratorial ten-
dency, Δχ [3] = 9.82, p = 0.020, and to prosocial tenden-
cies, Δχ [3] = 8.88, p = 0.031, to be the same across
countries significantly worsened the model fit. Instead, con-
straining the path from conspiratorial tendencies to proso-
cial tendencies to be the same across countries did not
worsen the model fit significantly, Δχ [3] = 6.18, p =
0.103. Therefore, we retained the latter model in which
the path from conspiratorial tendencies to prosocial tenden-
cies was constrained to be equal and the other paths were
free to vary, χ2 (209) = 727.51, p< 0.001, CFI = 0.96,
RMSEA = 0.06, SRMR = 0.07. We interpret the model’s
unstandardized solution because it is comparable across
countries (see Figure 1).
The association between individuals’ feelings of disgust
towards the political system and individuals’ conspiratorial
tendencies was significant in the USA, b = −0.20, p<
0.001, Italy, b = −0.22, p< 0.001, Korea, b = −0.17, p =
0.002, and the UK, b = −0.38, p< 0.001. Across all coun-
tries stronger feelings of disgust towards the political
system were associated with stronger doubts about the
authorities’ official version of the events about COVID-19.
The association was stronger in the UK and weaker in
Korea. In addition, disgust was not significantly associated
with prosocial tendencies in the USA, b = 0.06, p = 0.151
or Korea, b = −0.01, p = 0.846, but the association was sig-
nificant in Italy, b = −0.09, p = 0.025, and the UK, b =
-0.08, p = 0.039. Finally, prosocial tendencies were pre-
dicted by conspiratorial tendencies across all countries, b =
0.11, p<0.001. The indirect effect of disgust on prosocial
tendencies via conspiratorial beliefs was significant in the
USA, b = −0.02, SE = 0.01, CI95% (−0.04 to −0.01),
Italy, b = −0.03, SE = 0.01, CI95% (−0.04 to −0.01),
Korea, b = −0.02, SE = 0.01, CI95% (−0.03 to −0.01),
and the UK, b = −0.04, SE = 0.01, CI95% (−0.06 to−0.03).
Discussion
In the present study, for the first time, we examined whether
feelings of disgust towards the political system are asso-
ciated with stronger conspiratorial tendencies. In addition,
we tested the proposition that stronger conspiratorial ten-
dencies are linked to lower prosocial behavior to tackle
the pandemic. Finally, we investigated whether there was
a negative indirect effect from disgust towards the political
system to lower prosocial behavior via stronger conspirator-
ial thinking. These hypotheses were examined in four large
samples from the USA, Italy, Korea, and the UK.
Results showed the existence of a significant association
between disgust and conspiratorial thinking across coun-
tries. Individuals who reported more disgust towards
the political system were also less likely to believe to the
authorities’ “official version” of the events concerning the
Figure 1. Structural equation model showing unstandardized coefficients.
Note. Multiple coefficients indicate an unconstrained path and are reported as IT/UK/US/KOR. Gender, age, and political orientation are
covariates in the model. ***p< .001, **p< .01, *p< .05.
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pandemic. Not unlike other emotions, feelings of disgust
may have an adaptive function. Specifically, disgust may
motivate individuals to avoid diseases and other threatening
pathogens in the environment. Disgust may also signal
moral disapproval, leading individuals to reject perpetrators
of (perceived or real) moral violations (e.g., Kupfer and
Giner-Sorolla, 2017).
Here, we extend this research by showing for the first
time that system-level feelings of disgust (i.e., disgust direc-
ted at the political system) may be linked to the rejection of
information issued by official authorities, that is, more con-
spiratorial thinking. In the context of the current pandemic,
lower reliance on official sources of information may put
individuals at risk of contracting the disease. This form of
“system-avoidance” could have, therefore, negative and
paradoxical implications for individuals, and even increase
the susceptibility to the disease in some social groups.
Interestingly, cross-country comparisons showed that
the association between disgust against the political
system and conspiratorial tendency was significantly stron-
ger in the UK compared to the other countries (although the
association remained significant across all countries). This
difference indicates that in the UK, individuals who
reported stronger disgust were also more likely to engage
in conspiratorial thinking. Future research should examine
whether the stronger association in the UK also persists in
other circumstances—for instance, during the vaccine
roll-out. Future research should also test why such associ-
ation is larger in the UK compared to the other countries.
An interesting possibility is that, in the British context,
the perceived morality and legitimacy of the system are
considered more central features of the political system
(cf. Jackson et al., 2012). Thus, in the UK, people who
report stronger disgust towards the system (signaling their
concern with the system’s stance) are also less likely to
believe the authorities’ official version of the events.
Additional comparative studies are needed to examine
this speculation empirically.
Furthermore, consistent with findings from the previous
studies (Hornsey et al., 2021; Imhoff & Lamberty, 2020)
conspiratorial tendencies were significantly and negatively
associated with prosocial tendencies. People who believed
in conspiracy theories were less likely to express the
intentions to engage in cooperative and prosocial actions
that would be useful in keeping others safe during the
COVID-19 pandemic. Further, results indicated the exist-
ence of a significant indirect effect of disgust towards the
political system on intentions to act prosocially and help
control the spread of the virus via conspiratorial tendencies.
This set of results highlight the importance of considering
system-level emotional processes in individuals’ appraisal
of social systems and authorities. Indeed, individuals’ emo-
tional responses towards the system may contribute to
orient their behavioral intentions by shaping the way they
respond to the system.
Importantly, results concerning this model were broadly
consistent across the four countries included in this research
(Italy, the UK, the USA, and South Korea), a finding
that highlights the generalizability of the results across dif-
ferent cultural groups, cultural profiles, and world regions.
Notably, however, in the present study, the direct associ-
ation between disgust and prosocial intentions varied
across countries. Future studies should examine this associ-
ation further by including additional measures of cultural
values such as tightness/looseness (Gelfand et al., 2021)
or individualism/collectivism (Triandis & Singelis, 1998)
and investigating their potential effect in moderating the
relationship between disgust and prosociality.
Limitations and future directions
The present research supported the idea that across coun-
tries conspiratorial tendencies are an important explanatory
variable of the association between disgust towards the
political system and the intentions to act prosocially.
Interestingly, according to recent evidence (Biddlestone
et al., 2020), individuals’ conspiratorial tendencies may
be associated with cultural values. Biddlestone et al.
(2020) found that individuals’ beliefs in COVID-19 con-
spiracy theory were positively associated with vertical indi-
vidualism and horizontal individualism, but negatively
associated with horizontal collectivism. The model tested
here could be extended by considering the association
between disgust and cultural values.
Although we found a significant indirect effect across
samples from four different countries, it is important to
note that the cross-sectional nature of the current study
may limit our ability to draw causal inferences among vari-
ables. For example, it may be possible that there is a reci-
procal relationship between disgust towards political
systems and prosocial behavioral intention. It is also plausi-
ble that exposure to, and acceptance of, conspiracy theories
may result in stronger feelings of disgust towards the
system, especially when the system is portrayed as sinister,
immoral, or threatening. Future studies should make use of
longitudinal designs to examine how reciprocal relation-
ships between such variables unfold over time.
Another limitation of this research is that the conspira-
torial tendency was measured using a scenario-based
single item tapping into people’s beliefs about the author-
ities’ official version about COVID-19. Although we
adapted a validated single-item measure of conspiratorial
tendencies (Lantian et al., 2016) to the context of
COVID-19, it would be helpful to measure conspiratorial
tendencies using a broader array of items and measures
(Jolley & Paterson, 2020; Van Bavel et al., 2020). In a
similar vein, it is important to notice we assessed individuals’
intentions to engage in collective prosocial action aimed at
controlling the spread of the disease, rather than actual
behavior. Future research should extend this work by
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testing the association between individuals’ conspiratorial
tendencies and their actual behavioral responses in the
context of the pandemic.
A crucial task for future research is also to investigate the
antecedents of disgust towards the political system. Despite
their enormous relevance (Goodwin et al., 2001), very little
research has so far examined the roots of system-level emo-
tional processes (Solak et al., 2012). Both individual-level
(e.g., endorsement of specific ideologies) or system-level
(e.g., degree of system openness) characteristics may
impact on individuals’ propensity to feel disgust towards
the political system.
Finally, research should examine the association between
other negative emotions and individuals’ conspiratorial
beliefs across domains (cf. Martel et al., 2020). According
to Nabi (2002), disgust not only signals that individuals
feel repelled by something but can also reflect annoyance
or irritation. It has been suggested that moral disgust may
largely be a metaphor for anger (Bloom, 2004). Therefore,
more studies are needed that include measures of these emo-
tions and examine their links with disgust. Interestingly,
although the present study is consistent with research show-
ing that negative emotions are linked to increased skepticism
(e.g., Forgas, 2019), results also suggest that such skepticism
may not always have positive correlates. Skepticism towards
authorities’ “official version” was in turn associated with
lower cooperative and prosocial tendencies. This finding
highlights the importance of examining emotional processes
directed towards concrete objects, in addition to work con-
ducted on more general emotional states (cf. Martel et al.,
2020).
Conclusion
The findings from the present study suggest that feeling
disgust towards a political system may play a central
role in people’s intentions to act prosocially via individuals’
conspiratorial tendencies regarding the authorities’ version
of the events. Importantly, this pattern was broadly similar
and generalizable across four different countries. It is
important that governments and authorities attempt to
increase the transparency and trustworthiness of their
actions to tackle the current COVID-19 pandemic and
increase public engagement in prosocial behaviors.
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Notes
1. Of the Italian participants, 41.1% indicated they lived in a city/
large town, 40.4% smaller/average town, 18.5% village/rural.
The Italian sample distribution by region consists of
Piemonte (21.8%), Lazio (14.7%), Lombardia (10.7%),
Veneto (8.9%), Campania (8.7%), Sicilia (6.6%), and Emilia
Romagna (5.9%). The other regions represented in the
sample each accounted for < 5% of the Italian sample. Of the
UK participants 39.6% indicated they lived in a city/large
town, 40.3% in a smaller/average town, 20.1% in a village/
rural area. The UK participants were from various region,
including Greater London (6.4%), Lancashire (4.6%), West
Midlands (4.5%), Kent (4.1%), Devon (3.5%), North
Yorkshire (3.5%), Hampshire (3.5%), and the City of
London (3.3%). The other counties represented in the sample
each accounted for < 3% of the total number of participants.
Of the US participants 43.6% indicated they lived in a city/
large town, 42.4% in a smaller/average town, 14.1% in a
village/rural area. The US sample distribution by region con-
sists of Florida (9.7%), New York (8.4%), California (7.7%),
Texas (6.5%), Pennsylvania (5.4%), and Ohio (5.4%). The
other states represented in the sample each accounted for <
5% of the total number of participants. Of the Korean partici-
pants 81.8% indicated they lived in city/large town, 16.2% in
a smaller/average city, and only 2% in a village/rural area.
The Korean sample distribution by region (i.e., metropolitan
cities and provinces) consists of Seoul (28.6%), Busan
(16.0%), Incheon (14.9%), Daegu (12.4%), Gyungi (8.7%),
Gwangju (7.1%), and Daejeon (6.3%). The other regions repre-
sented in the sample each accounted for < 5% of the Korean
sample.
2. To examine whether common method variance (i.e., variance
due to the measurement method rather than the construct
intended; see Podsakoff et al., 2003) affected the results, we
used Harman’s single-factor test. Specifically, we ran a factor
analysis where all the items were forced to load onto an unro-
tated factor. Across countries, this factor accounted for 38%
(US), 39% (IT), 40% (Kor), and 39% (UK) of variance. This
was consistently lower than the 50% threshold, suggesting
that a single general factor does not account for the majority
of variance in the data.
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